

AESTAS

HIEMS

FRIENDSHIP, OLD AND NEW.  
HISTORICAL AND CONTEMPORARY  
PERSPECTIVES  
JOURNÉE D'ÉTUDE

LONGE  
PROPE

INTERNATIONAL WORKSHOP

MORS ET VITA

FEBRUARY 22, 2024

WARSAW, STAZIC PALACE  
HUGO KOŁŁATAJ HALL

CENTRE FOR THE HISTORY OF RENAISSANCE KNOWLEDGE,  
INSTITUTE OF PHILOSOPHY AND SOCIOLOGY, POLISH ACADEMY OF SCIENCES

PASIFIC



IF  
S  
PAN



European Research Council  
Established by the European Commission



FRIENDS4EVER PROJECT

@Friends\_PASIFIC





# CONTENTS

**2** | **INTRODUCTION**

**3** | **FRIENDS4EVER  
PROJECT**

**4** | **WORKSHOP  
PROGRAMME**

**8** | **TEXTS**

# INTRODUCTION

The journée d'étude brings together scholars working on friendship from both contemporary and historical perspectives. Its aim is to create a history of friendship that neither dismisses notions of early modern friendship as overly optimistic and idealistic, nor takes a nostalgic view of the past. Together we will try to combine contemporary and historical perspectives and test the extent to which they may be compatible or incompatible. Presentations are in the form of "impulsreferate" based on a specific texts.

“Une journée d'étude est une réunion qui mêle à la fois formation et information. Elle représente notamment une occasion propice pour analyser un projet ou se tenir au courant des dernières nouveautés sur un sujet spécifique.”

# VIRTUE AND SOCIABILITY. TEACHING FRIENDSHIP IN EARLY MODERN SCHOOLS AND UNIVERSITIES, 1518-1648.

PASIFIC GRANT PAN.BFB.S.BDN.630.022.2021. THIS PROJECT HAS RECEIVED FUNDING FROM THE EUROPEAN UNION'S HORIZON 2020 RESEARCH AND INNOVATION PROGRAMME UNDER THE MARIE SKŁODOWSKA-CURIE GRANT AGREEMENT NO 847639 AND FROM THE MINISTRY OF EDUCATION AND SCIENCE.

The project aims to provide a first in-depth study of an aspect that has largely been neglected in the literature on the topic: academic philosophical discussions on friendship in Europe in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. It will examine how two fundamental texts, Aristotle's treatment in 'Nicomachean Ethics' VIII-IX and Cicero's dialogue 'Laelius sive De amicitia', were studied in schools and universities. How did early modern teachers and students conceptualize friendship, and in which ways did they revisit, rethink, and revitalize its classical notions? Two hypotheses underlie the project. First, early modern academic discussions on friendship were based on the notions of virtue and sociability; second, both notions came under attack in an age of reformation and confessional conflict. The objective of the project is to bring to light the complex historical dynamics that resulted from the tension between traditional approaches to friendship, represented in the works of Aristotle and Cicero, and the drastic transformations that subverted established ways of life in early modern society.

Dr Matthias Roick is Marie-Curie-Skłodowska (PASIFIC) fellow at the Polish Academy of Sciences in Warsaw. From 2014 to 2021, he was Freigeist Fellow for the History of Ethics at the University of Göttingen and an affiliated fellow of the Lichtenberg Kolleg, Göttingen's Institute for Advanced Studies. He has widely published on different aspects of early modern ethics and virtue theory, including pieces on animal ethics, Petrarca's moral self-fashioning, the virtue of magnificence, and the relationship between literature, collection history, and ethics. He is the author of *Pontano's Virtues. Aristotelian Moral and Political Thought in the Renaissance* (2017) and the co-editor of two collected volumes, *Teaching Ethics in Early Modern Universities, 1500-1700* (2021), together with Valentina Lepri and Danilo Facca, and *Vera Amicitia. Classical Notions of Friendship in Renaissance Thought and Culture* (2022), with Patrizia Piredda.

# WORKSHOP PROGRAM

THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 22

---

**09:30 AM**

**MATTHIAS ROICK** (Centre for the History of Renaissance Knowledge, Institute of Philosophy and Sociology, Polish Academy of Sciences)

*Introduction: O friends, are there really no friends?*

**10:00 AM**

**ANNALISA CERON** (Università degli Studi di Milano)

*Female Friendship (Laura Cereta and Cassandra Fedele)*

**10:45 AM**

COFFEE BREAK

**11:15 AM**

**LUISA BROTTO** (University of Pisa)

*Charron on Friendship*

**12:00 AM**

**OLGA M. HAJDUK** (Centre for the History of Renaissance Knowledge, Institute of Philosophy and Sociology, Polish Academy of Sciences)

*Friendship and Death*

**12:45 PM**

LUNCH BREAK

**FALLA RESTAURANT**

**OBOŻNA 9, 00-332 WARSZAWA**

# WORKSHOP PROGRAM

THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 22

---

**2:45 PM**

**GIJS VERSTEEGEN** (Universidad Rey Juan Carlos, Madrid)  
*Diego de San Pedro's Cárcel de Amor*

**3:30 PM**

**DANILO FACCA** (Centre for the History of Renaissance Knowledge,  
Institute of Philosophy and Sociology, Polish Academy of Sciences)  
*Friendship and Dispute (Felwinger)*

**4:15 PM**

COFFEE BREAK

**4:45 PM**

**ANDRZEJ GNIAZDOWSKI** (Institute of Philosophy and Sociology, Polish  
Academy of Sciences)  
*Friendship and Community (Edith Stein)*

**5:30 PM**

**Final Discussion**, with a comment by **Valentina Lepri** (Centre for the  
History of Renaissance Knowledge, Institute of Philosophy and Sociology,  
Polish Academy of Sciences)

**7:30 PM**

**DINNER: FRIENDSHIP AND WINE**  
**MUZEALNA RESTAURANT,**  
**AL. JEROZOLIMSKIE 3,**  
**00-495 WARSZAWA**







## MATTHIAS ROICK

Centre for the History of Renaissance Knowledge,  
Institute of Philosophy and Sociology of the Polish Academy of Sciences

### Oh Friends, Are There Really No Friends?

Michel de Montaigne, *The Complete Essays*, trans. M.A. Screech (London: Penguin, 1991), 1.28, pp. 213-214.

[Montaigne on his friendship with Étienne de La Boétie] Our souls were yoked together in such unity, and contemplated each other with so ardent an affection, and with the same affection revealed each to each other right down to the very entrails, that not only did I know his mind as well as I knew my own but I would have entrusted myself to him with greater assurance than to myself.

Let nobody place those other common friendships in the same rank as this. I know about them – the most perfect of their kind – as well as anyone else, [B] but I would advise you not to confound their rules: you would deceive yourself. In those other friendships you must proceed with wisdom and caution [prudence et précaution], keeping the reins in your hand: the bond is not so well tied that there is no reason to doubt it. ‘Love a friend,’ said Chilo, ‘as though some day you must hate him: hate him, as though you must love him.’ That precept which is so detestable in that sovereign masterfriendship [cette souveraine et maîtresse amitié] is salutary in the practice [C] of friendships which are common and customary [amitiés ordinaires et coutumières], in relation to which you must employ that saying which Aristotle often repeated: ‘O my friends, there is no friend!’

Andreas Poleman, Disputationum Ethicarum octava, De amicitia ... Helmstedt: Lucius, 1608, sig. A4v-A5r.

### *Amor sui distinguitur*

35. Ut autem amor ille sui, quem amicitiam normam esse paulo ante diximus, rectius cognoscatur, sciendum est, Amorem sui interdum, sed a vulgo potissimum, usurpari pro eo, quo nonnulli ante omnia expetunt pecunias, honores, et voluptates corporis, et in iis | expetendis modum excedunt. Quo ipso eam sui partem solummodo amant, quae bruta vocatur. Unde etiam merito reprehenduntur. Interdum vero, et rectissime a sapientibus ac prudentibus Amor sui is dicitur, quando aliquis postpositis rebus externis, sapientiam et virtutem colit, et Mentis sive istius animae partis, qua homo dicitur homo, perfectionem studiose expetit. Atque hoc pacto se ipsum amare honestum est, et virum bonum decet.

### *Different kinds of selflove*

35. To get a better idea of self-love, of which we have just said that it is the norm of friendship, it is necessary to know that sometimes, especially by the common people, self-love is used as a term for that by which some strive for money, political power, and the pleasures of the body, and by which they exaggerate in their striving, and by which they love only that part of themselves which is called brutish. So they are rightly rebuked. At other times, however, the term self-love is used in the most correct way by the learned and the wise, when someone, having left behind external goods, cultivates wisdom and virtue, and eagerly strives for the perfection of his mind, that is, the part of the soul that makes us human. In this way, self-love is morally good, and worthy of a good person.

Cum etenim nostra iam inde a multis annis inita et diu bene culta amicitia et animorum coniunctio, superioribus aliquot annis non leviter sit sauciata ac miserabiliter prostrata saevisque veluti tempestatibus disturbata et tamen id neutrius nostram culpa, sed partim iniquitate temporum, partim machinatione aliorum factum sit, aequum sane iuxtaque pium erat innocentes iterum coalescere animos. Id quidem, quod etiam, favente tandem scilicet Deo, facile accidit in primo statim congressu, cum anno superiori et eo pluribus paulo mensibus, in aedibus proconsulis, apud magnificum et clarissimum virum dominum Matthiam Pulegium communem amicum convivae essemus. In eo nimirum congressu utrinque satis apparuit, non penitus a se invicem alienatos minimeque exulceratos fuisse animos, sed renovata consuetudine et familiaribus colloquiis ultro citroque habitis, in pristinam (uti plerumque in coitione fit) gratiam et non bene dissimulatam tam diu amorem feliciter rediisse.

For our friendship and union of souls, begun many years before and long cultivated, has suffered much for some years, and has been miserably undermined and disturbed, as it were, by atmospheric disturbances. However, this was not the fault of either of us, but partly due to the difficulties of our times, partly due to the machinations of others, and it was certainly right and pious to reunite our innocent souls. This is what happened when, by the grace of God, we met again for the first time [...] at a dinner in the house of the Proconsul, our mutual friend [...] At this meeting it became clear to both of us that our spirits were not deeply estranged or embittered, and that once we had met again and had intimate conversations between us, we would happily return to our former friendship (as is often the case when one meets) and to our love, which we had poorly disguised for too long.

## ANNALISA CERON

Università degli Studi di Milano

### Female Friendship (Laura Cereta and Cassandra Fedele)

J. Derrida, *The Politics of Friendship*, engl. ed., London, Verso, 1997, p. 96.

“Brothers have named themselves brothers in so far as they issue from one and the same mother: uterine brothers [...] **And what about the sister? Where has she gone?**” and p. 278: “From this vantage point, the question of friendship might well be at least an example or a lead in the two major questions of 'deconstruction': the question of the history of concepts [...] and **the question of phallogocentrism**”.

M. de Montaigne, *On Friendship*, in Id., *Essays*, English transl. by Ch. Cotton, vol. 2.

“Moreover, to say truth, **the ordinary talent of women is not such as is sufficient** to maintain the conference and communication required to the support of this sacred tie; **nor do they appear to be endowed with constancy of mind**, to sustain the pinch of so hard and durable a knot”

F. Nietzsche, *On the Friend*, in Id., *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, English transl. by Th. Common, Fiction 1892: “**As yet woman is not capable of friendship**: women are still cats, and birds. Or at the best, cows. **As yet woman is not capable of friendship**. But tell me, ye men, who of you are capable of friendship?”

Laura Cereta, *On friendship, Letter XXXIX to Santa Pelegrina*, in L. Cereta, *Collected letters of a Renaissance Feminist*, ed. by D. Robin, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1997, pp. 138-139.

“Those men who have written about friendship have one thought: they see it as a bond that is both extraordinary and by law itself lifelong, since it springs from the very font of honor. And no wonder, for ethics is that state of being useful which is also honorable. **The thing all men seek, however, is that which is useful. And so friendship, though extraordinary in its ethical dimensions and lifelong in its physical aspect, is disregarded among human desires.** Since this is the case, a certain **torpor of thought** sets in, and all of the esteem we have for friends ebbs and flows back to the place whence it originally came. Thus, though **the seed of mutual love** that was sown between us had already grown strong from a deep root of honor, it suddenly died, as if sucked dry **in ground without water**: it was as though this seed were stubborn enough to flee by itself from both nature and humankind.

The problem and its solution look to you to say why there has been an interruption in so important a cultivation. Am I to believe that you think that **the divine law of friendship** is about the exchange of flattery and gifts? What did you really think you would achieve with so long a silence, though not one on my part? Still, if I can be accepted as an arbiter in this situation, **I would refuse both flattery and gifts**, because both are false tokens, since virtue can neither be counterfeited nor bought. [...].

But if you have anything to say that would refute my complaints, I am asking you, trusting in your wisdom, to write it in a long and elaborate letter. [...] There is no place for us to hold a debate, as Carneades did [...] The question you raise has to be debated, not mocked or belittled, so that the sacred pledge of our loyalty and respect for one another, **though now beaten and broken, can be healed**, and so that everything - once the sickness in our thoughts about one another has been medicated - may soon be right again between us.

I am so concerned about you **that nothing is more precious to me than my being loved in return by you, who are the most beloved of friends**. If you were ever to catch me in some wrongdoing, I have no doubt at all, since you are a person of the utmost kindness, that you would be compassionate and forgiving. **After all, this is the hallmark of one's humanity: the ability to recognize one's own weakness.** Therefore dismiss the thought of a quarrel as the result of our difference of opinion. Nor should less lenience be reckoned as due the wrongdoer than her wrong. After all, which of us would inflict a punishment on the other, when she might not know the other's heart equally, and when there could be a mutual exchange between pure minds that are inextricably connected in every way? Vale. February 26, 1486.

Cassandra Fedele, *Letters and Orations*, ed. by D. Robin, Chicago The University of Chicago Press, 2000, Letter CIII, Addressee unnamed, p. 138.

“It is not my intention to prove wrong or refute Empedocles’ idea that **love is the first principle in nature**. Because of it the human race was born, is continually replenished, and will be sustained for all eternity. All things in nature are subject to its power. If we agree that **this bond of goodwill** is the founding principle of humankind, then love belongs all the more to those on earth. Since the first principle of love is that the powers of minds may be united for the sake of virtue and honor and so that one person may embrace another with goodwill. I honor you with the love due a father. Ever since I came to know your modesty and gravity, heard your wonderful eloquence, and saw your erudition praised by the most distinguished scholars, I am more inspired every day by **this pure and sacred friendship** of ours, and I have realized in talking with you face to face that you love me as a father loves his daughter, and as **Lodovico Balangino** also does, a most uncommon friend. Thus it is usual that in this one bond alone we should find **consolation for the many cares and woes of the world**. Etc. [Undated]”

## LUISA BROTTTO

University of Pisa

### Charron on Friendship

Pierre Charron, *Of wisdom three books, made English by George Stanhope*, London 1697.

1. Love [amitié] is a Pure, a Holy, and a Generous Fire, kindled in our Breasts by Nature; Its Primitive and Original Warmths were first discern'd in the mutual Affection of Hus I band and Wife, Parents and Children, Brothers and Sisters: But then, cooling by degrees as it dilated it self, Art and Human Invention found means to blow it up again, and supply fresh Fuel, by the Institution of Alliances, Societies, Fraternities, Colleges, and other Incorporations by which the parts of Mankind are cemented and united.

2. The Third Distinction of Love concerns the Strength and Intenseness, or the Weakness and Remissness of it. With regard to This Consideration it is again Twofold. One Common and Imperfect, which indeed ought rather to be term'd Benevolence or Well-wishing, Familiarity, Particular Acquaintance: And this varies exceedingly, and may differ almost infinitely in the degrees of it, each of which may be more or less close, and intimate, and strong than other: The Other is Perfect; and this is a sort of Phoenix, few, if any one Instance of it to be seen in the World; so far from being practised by Mankind, that they can scarce form a tolerable Idea of it to themselves; or reach up to the Force and Excellencies of the thing, by all the Strength of mere Imagination.

3. The Common Friendships may extend themselves to a great Number of Persons: But the true entire Friendship admits but of One Partner; and this is to all Intents and Purposes a Second Self: so that altho' the Persons are Two, yet their Hearts and Affections are One and the Same. And the necessity of confining such Friendships to Two only, is very evident from the Nature of the thing. For to suppose more, destroys the Notion, and obstructs all the Offices and Operations of it. For instance, To succour and



assist a Friend in his Distress, is an indispensable Obligation; but if we put the Case of Two such standing in need of our Help at the same time; and not only so, but desiring Kindnesses which are inconsistent and contrary to one another, Which way shall I turn my self; or how can I discharge my Obligations, when one of these is favour'd and relieved to the Prejudice and Neglect of the other? Again, My Friend imparts a Secret to me, What Distraction is here? If I reveal it, This is a Breach of Trust and Friendship, which obliges me to be Faithful in keeping what is thus deposited with me: But then, if I do not communicate it to my other Friend, this is Unfaithfulness too; for it is another Law of true and entire Friendship, to unbosom themselves freely, and to have no Reserves from each other. Thus you see the Confusion and Perplexity, the Impracticableness and utter Impossibility indeed of more Friends than One, in the highest and most genuine Acceptation of the Word. And, no doubt, Multiplication of Parts, and Division, is, gene I rally speaking, an Enemy to Perfection, as Union is a natu I ral and inseparable Property of it.

4. Some few Instances there are of this entire Friendship, and unreserv'd Communication of Souls in ancient Story. When Blossius was apprehended, upon the Account of a mighty Friendship known to be between Him and Tiberius Gracchus, who was already under Sentence of Condemnation for Seditious Practices; upon Examination what he would have done for his sake, he reply'd, That he would have stuck at nothing to do him Service. The Judges proceeded further, and asked, Whether if Gracchus had desired him to set the Temples on Fire, he would have comply'd with so Sacrilegious a Request: He answer'd again, That Gracchus was not capable of desiring so wicked a Proof of his Friendship; but upon supposition that he could, he should not have refused it. Now This was a very bold and a dangerous Answer. The first part of it indeed, that Gracchus could not entertain a Thought so impious, was no more than he might well enough venture to say; because, according to the Account we have already given of this Matter, every Friend in perfection is not only fully acquainted with the Disposition, and all the Thoughts of his Friend, which sufficiently qualifies him to be responsible for them all; but he is absolute Master of them, and so can dispose of them, as much as of his own. But that last Clause of doing

so if Gracchus had requir'd it, was idle and impertinent; for it does not in any Degree take off from what he had affirm'd before, concerning his Assurance of Gracchus not entertaining any such Desire, nor make the thing one Whit better or worse. Now this Instance shews us the perfect Harmony of Souls, with regard to the concurring Judgments and Inclinations of such Friends.

5. The Second Instance relates to their Fortunes. To which purpose we read of Three Friends, (This Number of Three I confess is a Contradiction to the Rules here proposed, and tempts us to think that this Friendship, tho' very extraordinary, had not yet attained to all the Degrees of just a Perfection) But Three however there were: Two of them in very plentiful, the other in as low Circumstances, who had a poor old Mother, and a young unmarried Daughter, both lying upon his Hands.

6. The Third Example goes higher still, and reaches to Life it self. And here we may reflect upon that well-known Story of two Friends. That a Tyrant had condemn'd one of them to die, and had appointed the Day and Hour of his Execution; but he with great Importunity obtain'd Leave to go and take Care of his Affairs and Family, upon this Condition, that he should give Security, and find one to be bound Bo l dy for Body, for his surrendring himself again at the Time prefix'd; and in case he fail'd, then his Bail to undergo the same Capital Punishment, which had been awarded to his Principal. The Condition was readily accepted, and the Prisoner produces his Friend to be bound for him, who accordingly was imprison'd in the other's stead. The Day of Execution came, and this Bondsman prepar'd himself to die with all imaginable Cheerfulness. But, as he was going about it, the Condemn'd Person came in, releas'd his Security, and offer'd himself to the fatal Stroke. This strange Genero l sity made such Impression upon the Tyrant, that, much out of Countenance, and full of Astonishment, he was con l quer'd into Mercy; set them both at Liberty, and made it his Request, that these brave Men would accept of the Proffers he made of his Kindness and Affection, and do him the Honour to admit him into their Number, and reckon that they had now a Third sincere and generous Friend.

## OLGA M. HAJDUK

Centre for the History of Renaissance Knowledge,  
Institute of Philosophy and Sociology of the Polish Academy of Sciences

### Friendship and Death

#### 1. Stefan Kucieński's effigy slab (Mnich Probostwo, Assumption of the Blessed Virgin Mary Parochial Church) - the fourth quarter of the sixteenth century.

##### Inscription on rim:

[G]ENEROSVS STEPHANVS KVCZINSKY DE KVcl[...] VIR DE ECCL(esi)A || DEI ET R[E]PVBL(ica) · BENE MERITVS [...]LIS · IN AMICITIA CONSTANS || OMNIBV[S ...]VS NEMINI MOL[ES]TVS · ERGA PAVPERES SV(m)[PT]UOS(us) || LIBERALIS EX HAC V[ITA] DECESSIT 27 IV[...]N [...] BAR|BARA || D[E] GALIENSKA KV[CZ]IN[S]KA · CONIVNX MOESTISSIMA MARITO || ADQ(ue) CHARISSIMO CVM LACHRYMIS PO[S]VIT

*The noble Stephan Kuczinsky from Kuci[...], a man well deserved in matters of church and state [...], constant in his friendship and annoying to no one, lavish in his spending when it came to the poor, departed from this life a free man on 27 June [...] Barbara de Galienska Kuczinska, grieving wife, built [this] in tears for her husband and dearest.*

#### 2. Epitaph to Paweł Głogowski (Płock, Cathedral of the Assumption of the Blessed Virgin Mary), 1580–1583. Jan Michałowicz from Urzędów's workshop.

##### Inscription on pedestal cartouche:

R(everendo) D(omino) PAVLO GLOGOWSKI DECANO | PLOCENSI VIRO || PIETATE ET SAPIE(n)TIA | SVMMA SACRARVM LITERARVM ET || IVRISPRVDENTIAE COGNITIONE PRAE|STANTI VITAE INNOCENTIA || MORVM CA|STITATE HOSPITALITATE MODESTIA | SINGVLARI CINERI || EIVS DOMICILIV(m) | HOC ANTE PRAEPARATV(m) ET DOTATV(m) || AMICI PP (posuere) OBIIT DIE X FEBRVARI ANNO | DOMINI M D || LXXX AETATIS SVAE LXXVIII

*For the reverend Paweł Głogowski, deacon of Płock an man of piety and wisdom, of highest learning in the sacred scriptures and in jurisprudence, of outstanding integrity in life, purity in mores, hospitality, singular modesty – his friends built this abode, kept in readiness and richly endowed, for his ashes. He died on 10 February 1580 at the age of 78.*

### 3. Monument to Bartłomiej Niszczycycki (Płock, Cathedral of the Assumption of the Blessed Virgin Mary), 1560, Santi Gucci Fiorentino.

Funded by Niszczycycki's friend, Wojciech Sobiejuski (also known as Starożrebski, Starozrzebski, ca. 1517–1580), Bishop of Chełm and Przemyśl.

#### Inscription in pedestal cartouche:

D(eo) · O(ptimo) · M(aximo) · S(uo) | BARTHOL(omae) O · NISCICZKI · || CANCEL(ari) O  
PLOCEN(su) · CANON(ico) | GNESNEN(su) · ANTIQVA || NOBILITATE GENERIS | CANDORE  
ET PROBITE MORVM PRAESTA(n)TI · ALBERT(us) | SOBIEIVSKI A STAROSREBI ·  
CRACO(viensis) · ET || DOBRINEN(sis) · | ARCHID(iaconu)S SEGRETVRIVS · REGIVS ·  
INTEGER || AMICVS | POSVIT · M · D · LX · OBYT ANN O D(omini) · M · D · L · VII · || DIE · XVIII ·  
| AVGVS(ti) · HORA · X · VIXIT AN(nos) · LIII DIE(s) · XV · || HORAS · X ·

*To the greatest and best God. For his Bartłomiej Niszczycycki, chancellor of Płock, canon of Gniezno, of old nobility, outstanding in his purity and integrity – Wojciech Sobiejuski from Starożreby, archdeacon of Kraków and Dobrzyń, royal secretary, full [trustworthy/true] friend built [this] in 1560. He died on 18 August 1557, in the tenth hour. He lived 53 years, 15 days, 10 hours.*

#### Inscription along portrait frame:

BATHOL(omae) O · NISCICZKI · CANCEL(ari) O · PLOCEN(su) · CANON(ico) · GNESNEN(su)

*For Bartłomiej Niszczycycki, chancellor of Płock, canon of Gniezno.*

### 4. Monument to Galeazzo Guicciardini (Kraków: galleries of the Dominican Church), 1558, Santi Gucci Fiorentino.

Funded by his friend, merchant Girolamo Cini of Florence.

#### Inscription in pedestal cartouche:

GALEACIO GVICIARDINO FLORENTINO VIRO VIRTUTE ET / NOBILITATE PRAESTANTI  
CVIVS PRAECLARAS ANIMI ET INGENII DO/TES MORS I<M>MATVRA SVRRIPVIT AMICO  
SVAVISS(imo) HIERONYMVVS CINVS / PATRITIVS FLOREN(tinus) AMICITIAE ATQ(ue)  
ADEO RELIGIONIS ERGO MON/VMENTVM HOC ERIGI CVRAVIT OBIIT VLT(ima) IVLII  
A(n)NO SALV/TIS M D LVII AETATIS VERO SVAE XXXV


*For Galeazzo Guicciardini, Florentine, a man outstanding in virtue and nobility, whose gifts of mind and character an untimely death has stolen away, dearest friend – Girolamo di Cino Cini, Florentine patrician, for the sake of friendship and religion, commissioned that this monument was built. He died 1557, at the age of 35.*

**Inscription along portrait frame:**

GALEACII GVICIARDINII PAT{E}R(itii) FLOREN(tini) EFFIGIES POSTHVMA

*Posthumous portrait of Galeazzo Guicciardini, Florentine Patrician.*

**JOACHIAM CAMERARIUS, ELM AND VINE EMBLEM, FROM THE SYMBOLA ET EMBLEMATA (NUREMBER, 1590), EMBLEM 34, BK. 1, 44.**



**AMICUS POST MORTEM – FRIENDSHIP AFTER DEATH**

**QUAMLIBET ARENTI VITIS TAMEN HAERET IN ULMO,  
SIC QUOQUE POST MORTEM VERUS AMICUS AMAT.**

**YET AS IT PLEASES THE VINE CLINGS TO THE WITHERED ELM,  
SO ALSO AFTER DEATH THE TRUE FRIEND LOVES.**

## GIJS VERSTEEGEN

Universidad Rey Juan Carlos, Madrid

### Diego de San Pedro's Cárcel de Amor

Diego de San Pedro, *Cárcel de Amor, Arnalte y Lucenda, Sermón* (José Francisco Ruiz Casanova ed.), Madrid: Cátedra, 2022.

1. *Leriano to the author*: "Wayfarer, for the love of God, I beseech you to follow me and aid me in this my grievous distress." *The author*: I who at that moment had more cause to be fearful than reason to answer him, stood stock-still, my eyes fixed on this strange vision, turning over in my heart conflicting considerations: to leave the path I was following seemed to be folly; not to respond to the plea of one who suffered so appeared to be inhuman cruelty; to follow him was perilous, and to abandon him was cowardly; and in my confusion I could not decide which was the better cause to choose. However, when my fright subsided and allowed my disturbed mind to find some calm, I realized how much more I was bound to care for virtue than for my life, and, ashamed of my hesitation, I set out along the path taken by him who had requested my aid.

*Leriano al auctor*: "Caminante, por Dios te pido me sigas y me ayudes en tu grand cuita". *El auctor*: Yo, que en aquella sazón tenía más causa para temer que razón para responder, puestos los ojos en la estraña vision, estove quedo, trastornando en el corazón diversas consideraciones. Dexar el camino que levava parecíame desvarío; no hazer el ruego de aquel que assí padecía figurávaseme inhumanidad; en seguille avía peligro; y en dexalle flaqueza. Con la turbación, no sabia escoger lo mejor; pero ya quel espanto dexó mi alteración en algund sosiego vi cuánto era más obligado a la virtud que a la vida; y, empachado de mí mesmo por la dubda en que estuve, seguí la vía de aquel que quiso ayudarse de mí.

2. *The author to Leriano.* In your words, sir, you have demonstrated that Love had the power to deprive you of your freedom, but not of your virtue; and this is proven by the fact that, in the state in which I see you, you must be readier to die than to talk; but to comfort my weary troubled mind you forced yourself to speak, judging from my past ordeal and my present disquiet that I must have little hope of escaping alive; and it was indeed so; but if, as a human being in need of assistance, you caused me to put my life at risk, as a man of perfect discretion, you have now saved it. (...) I shall gladly do what you command, and may it please God that my luck match my desire, so that your deliverance may stand witness to my diligence. I have such great affection for you, and your nobility so much obliges me to love you, that only to relieve your suffering will be reward enough for my labours. While I am away, you must temper your distress with the hope I offer you, so that when I return, should I bring you some good news, you still have some spark of life left to appreciate it.

*El auctor a Leriano: En tus palabras, señor, as mostrado pue pudo Amor prender tu libertad y no tu virtud, lo cual se prueba porque, segund te veo, debes tener más gana de morir que de hablar, y por proveer en mi fatiga forçaste tu voluntad, juzgando por los trabajos pasados y por la cuita presente que yo ternía de bevir poca esperança, lo que sin dubda era ssí; pero causaste mi perdición como deseoso de remedio y me remediástela como perfeto de juicio. (...) Yo haré de grado lo que me mandas. Plega a Dios que lieve tal la dicha como el deseo, porque tu deliberacion sea testigo de mi diligencia. Tanta afición te tengo y tanto me ha obligado amarte tu nobleza, que avría tu remedio por galardón de mis trabajos. Entre tanto que vo, debes templar tu sentimiento con mi esperança, porque cuando buelva, si algund bien te truxere, tengas alguna parte biva con que puedas sentillo.*

3. *The author:* And though in her words there was still enough coldness to cause me to hold my tongue, since in her expression I found encouragement to be bold and to speak out, every time that the opportunity offered I besought her to take pity on Leriano, and every time that I spoke to her about it – and there were many times – I found her answer harsh and could find no harshness in her demeanour. And as I was alert to anything which might be to our advantage, I fancied that I observed in her certain signs by which the enamoured heart betrays itself: when she was alone, I found her pensive; when among company, none too merry; she abhorred society and found solitude agreeable; often she would complain that she was sick in order to flee the merry-making; when she was in the public eye she would feign that she suffered from some ache; when she was left to herself she would heave great sighs; if Leriano was mentioned in her hearing, she would become distracted and talk beside the point, would turn suddenly red, and then pale, her voice would grow husky and her mouth become dry. And though she endeavoured to conceal these signs of emotion, her feelings of compassion overcame her discreet dissimulation. I say compassion, for there is no doubt that, as she later demonstrated, her perturbation came from pity and not from love. But as I then believed otherwise, when I saw these signs in her, I had new hope for my mission.

3. *El auctor.* ...aunque en sus palabras avía menos esquividad para que deviese callar, en sus muestras hallava licencia para que osase dezir, todas las vexes que tenía lugar le suplicaba se doliese de Leriano, y todas las vezes que ge lo dezía, que fueron diversas, hallava áspero lo que respondía y sin aspereza lo que mostrava; y como traía aviso en todo lo que se esperava provecho, mirava en ella algunas cosas en que se conosce el coraçon enamorado. Cuando estava sola veíala pensativa, quando estava acompañada no muy alegre; érale la compañía aborrecible y la soledad agradable. Más vezes se quexava que estava mal por huir los plazerres. Cuando era vista, fengía algund dolor; quando la dexavan, dava grandes sospiros. Si Leriano se nombrava en su presencia, desatinava de lo que dezía, bolvíase súpito colorada y después amarrilla, tornávase ronca su voz, secávesele la boca; por mucho que encobría sus mudanças, forçábale la pasión piadosa a la disimulación discreta. Digo piadosa porque sin dubda, segund lo que después mostró, ella recibía estas alteraciones más de piedad que de amor. Pero como yo pensaba otra cosa, viendo en ella tales señales tenía en mi despacho alguna esperança...



4. *The author.* But I, perceiving that there lay in such a scheme more danger than hope, argued with him and deflected him from his course, and, since he was in his anger unable to think clearly, he desired to know my opinion on how to proceed, which I gladly gave him, in order that he might not act in rage and repent in sorrow. And after my poor wit had hit upon the surest way, I spoke to him as follows:

*The author to Leriano.* Sir, I would wish that I were both gifted enough to praise your good sense and powerful enough to remedy your fortunes, so that you might be as happy as I desire and lauded as you deserve. I say this because of the wise patience you display at a time like this, for when you perceived that your wits were paralysed by passion, you realized that your actions would be governed not by what you know but by what you feel. Sensibly acknowledging this fact, you chose to err by acting upon my simple but unprejudiced advice rather than to do what you thought right by relying on your own judgment, spontaneous but hampered by emotion. I have given much thought to what ought to be done in this your great misfortune, and I find that, in my humble judgment, the first thing to attend to is your peace of mind, for it is your perturbation which leads you astray in the present instance.

*El auctor: Y viendo yo ser aquel consejo de más peligro que esperança, puesto con él en razón desviélo dél. Y como estava con la aceleración desacordado, quiso servirse de mi parecer en lo que oviese de delibrar, el cual me plogo dalle porque no dispusiese con alteración para que se arrepintiese con pesar: y después que en mi flaco juicio se representó lo más seguro, díxele lo que se sigue:*

*El auctor a Leriano: Assí señor, querría ser discreto para alabar tu seso como poderoso para remediar tu mal, porque fueses alegre como yo deseo y loado como tú mereces. Digo esto por el sabio sofrimiento que en tal tiempo muestras, que, como viste tu juicio embargado de pasión, conociste que sería lo que obrases, no segund lo que sabes, mas segund lo que sientes; y con este discreto conocimiento quesiste antes errar por mi consejo simple y libre que acertar por el tuyo natural y empedido. Mucho he pensado sobre lo que en esta tu grande fortuna se deve hazer, y hallo, segund mi pobre juicio, que lo primero que se cumple ordenar es tu reposo, el cual te desvía el caso presente.*

5. *The author*: Not for a moment on the entire journey did my moaning and sighing abate: and when I reached Leriano, I gave him the letter, and when he had finished reading it, I told him that he should not attempt to resist any further, nor dream of being happy, nor listen to any words of comfort, for there were too many good reasons why he should die. He answered me that that even more than before he now accounted me his truest friend, for I had advised him to do what was right.

*El auctor*: Nunca por todo el camino sospiros y gemidos me fallecieron, y cuando llegué a Leriano dile la carta, y como acabó de leerla díxelo que ni se esforçase, ni se alegrase ni recibiese consuelo, pues tanta razón avía para que deviese morir; el cual me respondió que más que hasta allí me tenía por suyo, porque aconsejava lo propio; y con boz y color mortal comenzó a condolerse.

6. *Reasons why men should honour women*: The third is that they assist us to develop the cardinal virtue of temperance, for in order not to disgust them and so come to be regarded with distaste, we become temperate in our eating and drinking and in all other things pertaining to this virtue: we are temperate in our speech; we are temperate in our manner; we are temperate in our actions, without by one whit departing from what is proper.

The tenth is because of the good advice which they invariably give us, for it often happens that in their quick judgement we find what we have been seeking in long study and much effort. What they advise is always peaceable, and never leads to scandal. They save many lives, they help us to keep peace, they restrain anger and assuage rage. Their views are always sound.

The fifteenth is because of the good manners which they oblige us to practise, which is one of the most important things of which men stand in need. If we are well-mannered we practise courtesy and eschew what displeases; we learn to respect our inferiors and converse easily with our superiors. And not only do they make us well-mannered but well beloved, for when we treat each man as he deserves, so each man returns to us what we deserve.

The seventeenth argument is that they inspire us to make music and bring us the enjoyment of its pleasures. For whom are those sweet songs sung? For whom are those pretty ballads performed? For whom do voices sing in tune? For whose sake have all the elements of song been refined and made more subtle?

The nineteenth argument is that they refine our talents. Those who, as I have said, sing or play musical instruments, for their sake so apply themselves to it that they attain the highest perfection which can be reached in that art. Poets for their sake give so much study to the verses they compose that what was well said they make to seem still better, and they polish and prune in such fashion that what they feel in their hearts in all sincerity they express in novel and courtly style in the songs or devices or poems that they choose to compose.

Because of them were inaugurate those regal joustings and sumptuous tournaments and gay festivities. Because of them gracious accomplishments are encouraged, and all manner of courtesy begins and ends.

*Razones por que los ombres son obligados a las mugeres. La tercera, porque de la templança nos hazen dignos, que por no selles aborrecibles, para venir a ser desamados, somos templados en el comer y en el beber y en todas las otras cosas que andan con esta virtud. Somos templados en la habla, somos templados en la medida, somos templados en las obras, sin que un punto salgamos de la onestedad.*

*La dezena es por el buen consejo que siempre nos dan, que a las vezes acaece hallar en su presto acordar lo que nosotros c(o)n largo studio y diligencias buscamos. Son sus consejos pacíficos sin ningund escándalo: quitan muchas muertes, conservan las pazes, refrenan la ira y aplacan la saña. Siempre es muy sano su parecer.*

*La quinzena es por la buena criança que nos ponen, una de las principales cosas de que los ombres tienen necesidad. Siendo bien criados usamos la cortesía y esquivamos la pesadumbre, sabemos onrar los pequeños, sabemos tratar los mayores; y no solamente nos hazen bien criados, mas bienquistos, porque como tratamos a cada uno como merece, cada uno nos da lo que merecemos.*

*La dieziete razón es porque nos conciertan la música y nos hazen gozar de las dulcedumbres della. ¿Por quién se asueñan las dulces canciones? ¿Por quién se cantan los lindos romances? ¿Por quién se acuerdan las bozes? ¿Por quién se adelgazan y sotilizan todas las cosas que en el canto consisten?*

*La diezinueue razón es porque afinan las gracias: los que, como es dicho, tañen y cantan, por ellas se desvelan tanto que suben a lo más perfecto que en aquella gracia se alcanza; los trovadores ponen por ellas tanto estudio en lo que troban que lo bien dicho hazen parecer mejor, y en tanta manera aldegazan que propiamente lo que sienten en el corazón ponen por nuevo y galán estilo en la canción o invención o copla que quieren hazer.*

*Sermón ordenado por Diego de Sant Pedro porque dixeron unas señoras que le desseavan oír predicar:*

1. Well, to remedy this danger, in which lovers so often stumble, one must bring moderation in words and honesty in treatment, and sanity in actions, and temperance in desires, and dissimulation in talks, and meekness in movements.

*Pues para remedio deste peligro, en que los amadores tantas vezes tropieçan, deve traer en las palabras mesura y en el meneo honestidad, y en los actos cordura, y en los desseos templança, y en las pláticas dissimulación, y en los movimientos mansedumbre.*

2. Oh lover! If your friend wants you to suffer, suffer; and if she wants you to die, die; And if she wants to condemn you, go to hell in body and soul. What more benefit do you want than wanting what she wants? Make your heart receptive to everything that may come to you; and if it is good, love it; and if it is bad, suffer it; everything that comes to you from her is a reward for you.

*¡O Amador! Si tu amiga quisiere que penes, pena; e si quisiere que mueras, muere; e si quisiere condenarte, vete al infierno en cuerpo y en ánima. ¿Qué mas beneficio quieres que querer lo que ella quiere? Haz igual el corazón a todo lo que te pueda venir; e si fuere bien, ámalo; e si fuere mal, súffrelo; que todo lo que de su parte te viniere es galardón para ti.*

3. What do you think someone who knows that by taking [men's] lives you reward their services will say? For the lion and the snake it is always good to kill. Well, ladies, for God's sake, let each one fulfil their task, yours is [inspiring] love and good manners and redeeming and consoling.

*¿Qué os parece que dirá quien supiere que quitando las vidas galardónáis los servicios? Para el león y la sierpe siempre es bueno matar. Pues dexad, señoras, por Dios, usar a cada uno su oficio, que para vosotras es el amor y la buena condición y el redimir y el consolar.*

## DANILO FACCA

Centre for the History of Renaissance Knowledge,  
Institute of Philosophy and Sociology of the Polish Academy of Sciences

### Friendship and Dispute

Johann Paul Felwinger, *Brevis Commentatio de disputatione* ... (Altdorf: Hagen, 1659), pp. 2-3.

2. We come to the definition [of disputation] which is not uniformly agreed upon by all. [The jurist] Henning Renneman defines it as follows: “A disputation is a scholarly practice in which a question that is doubtful and not without merit is discussed in a proper manner by one who speaks for it and another who speaks against it. In the end, the aim is to discover the truth of the matter through the clash of mutual arguments, providing opposing arguments”. [The theologian and philosopher] Jacob Martini defines [disputation] as “a peaceful confrontation on the subject in question, undertaken either to discover the truth, or to stimulate the mind, or to put oneself to the test”. According to Salzhuber, instead, it is “an open and rule-guided discussion of a word or a thing, either to inquire the truth, or to exercise one’s mind, undertaken by one or more participants. For one can discuss with oneself in private, that is, think about different and opposing arguments”. [The Danish physician and grammarian Rasmus] Bartholin says: “A disputation is a confrontation of propositions in which one side tries to defend the subject in question as best it can, and the other to attack it.” To me, it seems appropriate to formulate a definition of the disputation in this way: disputation is a confrontation between doctrines on a given subject, defended by arguments and reasons, and conducted for the sake of truth.

2. [...] accedamus ad definitionem eius, quae non uniformiter ab omnibus constituitur. Henningus Rennemanus [...] ita definit: disputatio est actus literarius, quo quaestio dubia et non inutilis, ab altero asserente, altero vero illi contradicente sic rite disseratur, ut ex contradictionis per argumenta contraria inter se comparata mutuae collisione tandem veritas investigatur. Jacobus Martini definit, quod sit: Placida de re proposita collatio, vel investigandae veritatis, vel ingenii excitandi, vel tentandi gratia instituta. Salzhuberus vero: Est artificiosa et ingenua alicuius vocabuli, vel rei disceptatio, veritatis vel indagandae, vel exercendi ingenii causa, ab uno, vel pluribus, instituta et suscepta. Nam unus etiam secum privatim disputare potest, hoc est contrarias et diversas rationes ponderare. Bartholinus inquit: Disputatio est collatio sententiarum, qua alter pro viribus propositum defendere nititur, alter impugnare, veritatis declarandae ergo. Nobis placet definitionem disputationis formare talem: Disputatio est artificiosa de aliquo sententiarum argumentis et rationibus oppositis munitarum inter se collatio, veritatis gratia instituta.

Johann Paul Felwinger, *Brevis Commentatio de disputatione* ... (Altdorf: Hagen, 1659), pp. 90-91.

A practical example for the disputant. Thesis of the respondent.

Thesis: *The political community has its origin in nature.*

Aristotle proves this point in the following way. An entity whose parts are by nature must be by nature as a whole. Therefore, the political community, something that is brought together from such parts, will be by nature. The minor premise is clear because the political community consists of villages, the villages of neighbourhoods, the neighbourhoods of families, and the family of prior partnerships, that is, between husband and wife, master and slave, father and children, all parts that are obviously natural. He proves this point, ultimately, by the fact that there are parts even simpler than those mentioned, that is human beings. The political community consists of them, or rather is composed of those partnerships, and he therefore demonstrates human beings are political animals by nature, made for community and society. On this behalf, they were given speech, so that they could point out what was right and what was wrong, something that was denied to other animals.

Invitation to critically test this thesis for its value, directed at the opponent.

Since I am well aware, excellent and most learned Master [name of person], most beloved patron and friend, that many are convinced of the opposite of my thesis, and since I know how much your Excellency thinks differently from me, I cannot help inviting your Excellency, my friend, to test my thesis for its value. For I have not undertaken this disputation for the sake of ostentation, or because I think my learning so great that I should show it in public, but to uphold the mandate and will of those whose request I dare not to obstruct. I know very well how flawed the instrument of my talent and knowledge is. [...] But you, excellent and most learned opponent, will give us the arguments against my thesis that you have prepared at home. When you have presented them briefly and in the manner of syllogisms, my friend, you will engage us [in a debate]. In turn, I assure your Excellency of all my friendship and honor, and of the ready and prompt performance of my duties within my limited means.

## *Opponent*

Most excellent and most distinguished respondent, my most honoured patron, friend and compatriot! I thank you very much for your invitation [...]. I would have wished that the most learned respondent would have given the task of being a credit to this province and to Sparta [as in the saying of Euripides] to someone else. For he knows very well that not only do I have great difficulty with the language, but that I am also little versed in this kind of knowledge. But since he demands my friendship, which we have so carefully cultivated between us, I take this burden upon myself, and earnestly pray that the argument I am about to present may be favourably received. The political community does not have its origin in nature, and I will try to prove this in the following way: Everything that is natural has not been created by humans [...]

Specimen praxeos disputanti. Thesis respondentis.

Ἐκθεσις: *Civitas origo a natura est.*

Probat hoc Aristoteles ita: cuius partes omnes sunt a natura, illud ipsum totum quoque est a natura. Ergo ipsa Civitas tamquam conflatum quid ex istis partibus erit a natura. Minor inde clara est quia Civitas constat ex pagis, pagus ex vicis, vicus ex familiis, familia ex societatibus priis, nimirum ex societate nuptiali, dominica et paterna, quae omnes partes natura constant, ut manifestum est. Imo etiam probat ex illarum partium adhuc simplicioribus partibus, videlicet ex homine. Ex quo, aut quibus omnes allatae societates constant, ita ut ostendat hominem esse natura animal politicum, civile sive sociabile. Quo nomine ipsi a natura datus sit sermo, ut significet iustum et iniustum, quod caeteris animalibus denegatum est.

Invitatio ad huius theseos ventilationem, directa ad Dominum opponentem.

Cum sciam, praestantissime atque doctissime domine, fautor atque amice singulariter dilecte, quod multi contrarium nostrae theseos statuunt, et quantum scio etiam Tuam Praestantiam alius a me sentire, non potui quin ad thesin meam ventilandam Tuam praestantiam, amice, invitare, cum disputationem hanc non ostentationis gratia, aut quod tantum eruditionis mihi tribuerem, ut illam publice ostenderem, susceperim, sed mandato et voluntate eorum, quorum petitioni refragari religio mihi est, sustineam. Novi namque probe quam curta mihi ingenii et scientiae sit suppellex [...] Iam tu, Praestantissime atque Doctissime domine opponens, communicabis nobiscum tua domi praeeditata contra thesin nostram argumenta, iisdem breviter et syllogistice prolatis, amice, nos exercebis. Spondemus vicissim tuae praestantiae omnem amicitiam honorem officiaque, quae a nostra tenuitate proficisci possunt, promptissima ac paratissima.

## *Opponens*

Praestantissime atque Pereximie Domine Respondens, Fautor, Amice atque conterraneae honoratissime! Pro tua invitatione [...] tibi maximas agam et habeam gratias. Optarem ut Doctissimus Dominus Respondens provinciam hanc et Spartam exornandam alii obtulisset, cum ipsi probe notum sit me summa non solum linguae difficultate laborare, sed etiam in hoc scientiae genere parum exercitatum esse. Verum postulante nostra amicitia, quae hactenus inter nos religiose culta, onus hoc in me suscipiam, magnopere rogans, ut ea, quae in medium prolaturus sum, dexterrime accipiantur. Civitatem a natura originaliter non esse conabor ita probare: Quidquid a natura est, non demum ab hominibus constituitur [...]



## ANDRZEJ GNIAZDOWSKI

Institute of Philosophy and Sociology of the Polish Academy of Sciences

### Friendship and Community

Edit Stein, *An Investigation Concerning the State*, trans. Marianne Sawicki (Washington DC: Institute of Carmelite Studies, 2006), pp. 17-28

#### c) State and ethnicity

Furthermore, the equivalence of state and sovereignty entails the detachability of civil community and ethnic community, which often are taken to be necessarily bound to each other, if not held to be completely identical. They become separable first in the [17] sense that the ethnic community can survive if sovereignty, and with it statehood, is destroyed. The people can remain unaffected, in the distinctiveness of its community life, if it is deprived by an outside force of the possibility of living according to its own laws. (As an example, take the destruction of the Polish state. This did not cancel the survival of the Polish people; perhaps Poland even became a nation to a greater degree afterwards than it was before.)

This must be further illuminated through an investigation of the special features of the ethnic community as such. But first we turn to the other side of the open question: whether a state community can also survive the destruction of the ethnic community. This can have a twofold sense:

1. Must the state be built upon a unitary ethnic community, or is it conceivable for a state to include a plurality of ethnic units complete unto themselves and set off from one another?
2. Would a state be possible which had no ethnic community at all for its basis?

The first question is answered by the fact that the existential possibility (Existenzmöglichkeit) of the state is not bound to the ethnic unit. The [18] national state or ethnic state is one special variety of state, but not state as such. It is very well possible for a series of different ethnic communities to become united by one force representing a civic unit embracing them all, a force that manages their life along certain lines homogeneously or even heterogeneously, without interfering with their ethnic preferences. It's harder to decide the second question: whether the state requires any ethnic community at all for its basis. We established earlier that the individuals belonging to the state form a community. This is what Aristotle was talking about when he said that the state is held together more by *φιλία* than by justice, and that righteousness alone — without *φιλία* — couldn't do it. The meaning of *φιλία* in the context from which this citation is taken is rather uncertain, no doubt about it. But one basic meaning that is generally intended is that of community consciousness (Gemeinschaftsbewußtsein). Some [19] kind of community or other is going to encompass all the individuals belonging to a state as a whole, even an ethnically disunified one. However, this is not to be regarded as something constituting the state as such; that is, it's not necessarily required by the state's ontic fabric. The latter demands only a range of persons as belonging to the substance of the state and a particular kind of relation of those persons to the state as a whole (which is about to be discussed). The ontic composition of the state leaves open the issue of how the persons might stand to one another. Not from the composition of the state, but rather from the composition of minded [geistige] persons, is it to be made intelligible that as we already indicated — [1] a concrete civic pattern develops on the basis of a[n already] subsisting community; or to put it another way, a ribbon of community winds around the persons involved in that civic pattern; and furthermore [2] that these ties of community are required in order for the existence of a state to be secured.

[20] The civil community requires —that's the main point— no ethnic community in order to be. Not until after we've conducted a thorough investigation of what ethnic community is, will we be able to decide whether, [in a case] where a state whole does not take several ethnic communities for its basis, the affiliation of individuals has got to be a specifically ethnic community.

[21] A people [Volk] differs from the closer communities that we considered earlier —family and friendship circle— in this: [1] that with those, the foundation of the community was formed by altogether particular individuals; [2] that those individuals entered into the life of the community with their entire personal substance; and [3] that they all came in contact personally with each other.

(Admittedly, these stipulations apply only if you take family and friendship in the strictest sense of the words, and don't take all individuals who are kin by blood to be a family or all individuals who have friendly relations with one person to be a friendship circle. By family is understood here only the ongoing community of life, grounded upon a marital community or on a blood kinship. By one friendship circle [is meant] the ongoing community of life of two or more persons who are connected purely through an attraction rooted mutually in personal distinctiveness. If family and friendly communities are grasped in this way, then it's no challenge to the declared stipulations if someone points out the undeniable fact that neither family members nor friends always fully "understand" one another. Such more or less extensive estrangement or alienation is in fact to be widely noted, but in every case it represents a breach of the community concerned and doesn't alter the fact that according to the intention of community, the person is supposed to be taken up into it with his or her complete substance.)

On all these points, the ethnic community is arranged otherwise. It comprises an open multiplicity of individuals, so that personal contact for all those who belong to it is impossible in practice. The ethnic community can pick up new individuals without regard to their personal distinctiveness (at least to a great extent; limits obtain unilaterally inasmuch as not every individual personality allows itself to assimilate to every ethnic [22] community) [Volksgemeinschaft]. And the ethnic community never makes the demand that the whole personal life of individuals is to be assumed into itself. But even if greater leeway is allowed here for individual personal life, still the tethers that tie that life to the people are scarcely less secure than the more tightly stretched ones of the closer community.

In the broader community, first of all, everything that constitutes community as such must of course continue to hold:

- it needs one current of life to be present, of which all individuals belonging to the community partake;
- it needs at least –in a portion of its members one consciousness of community to be present, encompassing the entire open multiplicity of the individuals who belong according to intention;
- personal contact of all members, which is lacking, must be replaced by a continual mediation of solidarity among those elements separated in time and space;
- every member of the ethnic community must bear the imprint of his or her membership in it, if not as a consciousness of membership, then at least in the fact that the member represents the ethnic type;
- finally, like any community, the people needs to cultivate one such type, forming the personal fabric of its members along certain lines, and one uniform ethnic character.

Now a people, in contrast to other communities, has one more essential concrete way of being itself. A community having the [23] breadth and scope of a people still cannot claim to be an ethnic community unless and until there emerges from its mentality [Geist] a distinctive culture particularized by the community's special character. A culture is a cosmos, homogeneous unto itself and outwardly circumscribed, of mental goods (be they self-sufficient objects like the works of art and science, or be they routinized modes of life concretized by persons in the act of living their lives). Each culture points back to a mental center to which it owes its origin. And this center is a creative community whose special distinctive soul [spezifische seelische Eigenart] shows up and is mirrored in all the community's productions.

The community that stands behind a cultural cosmos can in principle be more extensive than an ethnic community. A "culture group" can encompass a variety of peoples at any given time and over the course of time. Similarly, smaller communities like a caste or an extended family form their own cultural "microcosm." But only for an ethnic community is it essential to be culturally creative. The community of the culture group can [24] perhaps be depleted, in that the peoples belonging to it share their cultural goods (or, hand them down to others in the course of time) and collectively feed on them without being productive as a coherent unit. Likewise, the smaller community won't be touched in its substance if it merely partakes of the cultural goods of the encompassing community without enriching that community, or if it cooperates therein only as a component of the greater whole and not as a self-sufficient unit. Peoplehood dies only with its spiritual creativity.

In this "cultural autonomy," as a specific characteristic of the ethnic community, we find a remarkable reflection of sovereignty as that which is specific to the state, and [so we find] something like a material basis for that formal [right of] self-regulation. This casts light upon the connection of people [i.e., ethnic group] and state: the people, as a "personality" with creative distinctiveness, begs for an organization that secures for it a life according to its own lawfulness [nach eigener Gesetzlichkeit]. The state, as a social pattern that organizes itself on its own authority, calls for a creative power that lends content and direction to its organizing potential and confers an inner authenticity [upon it].

The question that sent us off on the last reflection - whether the state needs to have an ethnic community for its foundation is one that we're now ready to answer. The issue is resolved by the fact that, while it's entirely conceivable to have a state that lacks this basis, a state where the only bond among those who belong [25] to it is "loyalty" (in Kjellén's senses) [Der Staat als Lebensform], i.e., the mutuality of laws and duties in regard to the state as a whole, a state modeled in that way would [have some deficiencies. It would] have no inner existential authenticity, so to speak. It would always have clinging to it the character of something hollow and ephemeral. It might perhaps hold together for a time by authoritarian control, but not by any inner gravity of its own.

Earlier we accepted the possibility of a unification of several peoples into one state whole. Nothing about that possibility is canceled by the fact that each of the different ethnic communities has its own unique personality. None of the ethnic communities necessarily requires a mode of statehood appropriate to itself alone. All they [really] need is a civic organization that takes their intrinsic lawfulness into account. It's only when civil law and ethnic personality are directly opposed to each other that the survival of one of them, or even both of them, is imperiled. That is no less possible with unitary peoplehood than with several peoples, one of which is favored at the expense of the others.

To this explanation let's append a few remarks about the relationship of people and nation, especially since much of what we cited as characteristic of the people is, from another angle,

ascribed to the nation. Thus Kjellén regards the nations as big "individuals" with characteristic idiosyncrasy that is attested in the developed personal type of their members, in the national language, in the specific tinge of "public opinion," and the like. Conversely, the people appears to him to hold together by the bond of loyalty alone. It would be hard, though, to apply this sort of definition consistently. If the ethnic community amounted to nothing more than the solidarity of laws and duties, then the ethnic community would be the product of the state and would presuppose the state which Kjellén himself does not intend.

[26] In terms of "great powers" or analogues of individual personalities, you could regard peoples as nations. The difference, I believe, is to be found in this: that the consciousness of community which already is proper to the people is raised to reflective clarity in the nation; and, parallel to that, in the nation there lives an image of its specific uniqueness and this uniqueness is "cultivated," while the people only just has this uniqueness deployed in all its life and accomplishments, without itself being clear about all that, and therefore also without stressing it or adverting to it in any way. Hence, genuine nationhood is possible only on the basis of peoplehood.

Peoplehood tends to develop into nationhood if the people achieves a certain maturity. This is analogous to an individual person who becomes acquainted with herself only in the course of her life, without being able to say that she possessed no personal uniqueness at all before that "self-recognition."

What the state demands for its foundation is not nationhood but a community of people. Development toward nationhood is [27] of interest for the state only inasmuch as it is of interest for the resilience of peoplehood. Therefore it's a bad omen for the foundation of the political system if sentiment toward nationhood does not reach a certain level or break out on particular occasions – for example, when there's danger that something might

hinder the open display of peoplehood.

An objection against Kjellén's treatment of the relationship between state and nation arises on yet another score. The nation as he sees it first acquires a mental content for its life through the coalescence of the state; while the state in turn calls for completion through the "natural essence of the nation." The words "nature" and "mind" should not be weighed against each other here, because Kjellén does not say how he wishes to have them understood. But if you take them seriously in the strict sense, then it's impossible to face off state and nation against one another like nature and mind (or even "reason"). All community is the mental kind that goes for a people as well as a nation. The people has its natural basis, to be sure, and because of that, so does the state. But the people does not, as community, comprise "nature" and also does not need the state to complete it with some living mental content.

How is the line to be drawn between nature and mind within a people and within a state? Should a special "reasonableness" be ascribed to the state in a particular sense? This is what we are about to discuss.



